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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE NO. 1: Is there a genuine issue as to any material fact 
as to whether or not there is an easement in favor of the 
defendant, Chadaz, over the property owned by the plaintiffs? 
A. Standard of Review: The conclusions of the trial court 
are reviewed for correctness, and no deference is given to the 
trial court's conclusions. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 
1989); Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc.. 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991) 
and Niederhauser Bldrs. & Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P. 2d 1193 
(Utah App. 192). When reviewing a summary judgment, the party 
against whom the judgment has been granted is entitled to have all 
the facts presented, and all the inferences fairly arising 
therefrom, considered in a light not favorable to him. Morris v. 
Farnsworth Motel. 259 P.2d 297 (Utah 1953). Wineger v. Froerer 
Corp. , 813 P. 2d 104 (Utah 1991) and Neiderhauser Bldrs. & Dev. 
Corp.. 824 P.2d 1193 (Utah App. 1992). Therefore, the appellate 
court applies the same standard as the trial court and affirms the 
summary judgment only if there is no dispute as to any material 
fact. Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977) and Themy v. 
Seagull Enters., Inc.. 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979). 
B. Preservation of Issue for Appeal: This issue was 
preserved for appeal by the "Verified Objections Of Defendant, Reta 
Chadaz, To Memorandum Of Points And Authorities In Support Of 
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Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment" (See R. at pp. 81-115); 
"Verified Motion For Summary Judgment" (See R. at pp. 116-118); 
"Verified Memorandum of Points And Authorities In Support Of 
Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment" (See R. at pp. 119-149); 
"Supplemental Memorandum Of Points And Authorities In Support Of 
Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment And Reply To Plaintiffs' 
Supplemental Argument" (See R. at pp. 250-288); and "Transcript Of 
Summary Judgment Hearing" (See R. at p. 350). 
ISSUE NO. 2: Did the trial court commit error in applying the 
law so as to determine there is no easement in favor of the 
defendant Chadaz over the property owned by the plaintiffs? 
A. Standard of Review; The trial court's legal conclusions 
are reviewed for correctness, and no deference is given to the 
trial court. This court is free to reappraise the trial court's 
legal conclusions. Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am. Inc. , 814 P.2d 1108 
(Utah 1991); Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exch. , 751 P.2d 248 (Utah App. 
1988); and Wineaar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). 
B. Preservation of Issue for Appeal: This issue was 
preserved for appeal by the "Verified Objections Of Defendant, Reta 
Chadaz, To Memorandum Of Points And Authorities In Support Of 
Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment" (See R. at pp. 81-115); 
"Verified Motion For Summary Judgment" (See R. at pp. 116-118) ; 
"Verified Memorandum of Points And Authorities In Support Of 
Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment" (See R. at pp. 119-149) ; 
"Supplemental Memorandum Of Points And Authorities In Support Of 
Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment And Reply To Plaintiffs' 
2 
Supplemental Argument" (See R. at pp. 250-288) ; and "Transcript Of 
Summary Judgment Hearing" (See R. at pp. 350). 
ISSUE NO. 3: Should the trial court have amended or made 
additional findings in accordance with Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure when granting plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment? 
A. Standard of Review: While the trial court's failure to 
adequately identify the grounds for its decision is not necessarily 
reversible error, " . . . the presumption of correctness 
ordinarily afforded trial court rulings has little operative effect 
when members of [the appellate] court cannot divine the trial 
court's reasoning because of the cryptic nature of its ruling." 
Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992); Allen 
v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins.. 839 P.2d 798 (Utah 1992). 
B. Preservation of Issue for Appeal: 
This issue was preserved for appeal by the "Verified Motion 
for Amendment to Memorandum Decision" (See R. at pp. 298-300 and 
315-317); and "Verified Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Defendant's Motion for Amendment to Memorandum Decision" 
(See R. at pp. 301-307 and 318-324). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. Section 57-3-2(1). 
Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in 
the manner prescribed by this title, each original 
document or certified copy of a document complying with 
Section 57-4a-3, whether or not acknowledged, each copy 
of a notice of location complying with Section 40-1-04, 
and each financing statement complying with Section 70A-
9-402, whether or not acknowledged shall, from the time 
of filing with the appropriate county recorder, impart 
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notice to all persons of their contents. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) 
Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The mot i on, 
memorandum and affidavits shall be filed and served 
in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) 
Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a 
jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the 
facts specially and state separately its conclusions of 
law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to 
Rule 58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory 
injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute 
the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not 
necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, 
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not 
be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses. Findings of a 
master to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It will be 
sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
are stated orally and recorded in open court following 
the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or 
memorandum decision filed by the court. The trial court 
need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). 
The court shall, however issue a brief written statement 
of the ground for its decision on all motions granted 
under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b) , 56, and 59 when the 
motion is based on more than one ground. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs seek to have the court declare that they own 
certain real property free and clear of any easement claimed by 
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Reta Chadaz. Reta Chadaz seeks to have the court declare that she 
owns a 66 foot wide right of way across the real property owned by 
the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' received ownership of the property in 
question by Warranty Deed dated July 23, 1993 and recorded on July 
29, 1993. Reta Chadaz's ownership of the 66 foot wide right of way 
is based upon a Special Warranty Deed dated October 24, 1980 and 
recorded on December 9, 1980. The reservation of the right of way 
in said Special Warranty Deed was to fulfill a contract obligation 
between the grantor of said Special Warranty Deed and Reta Chadaz. 
Plaintiffs filed this action to quiet title in the disputed 
property (See R. at pp. 2-16) and Reta Chadaz filed a Counterclaim 
to quiet her title in the right of way (See R. at pp. 17-28) . Both 
parties moved for summary judgment (See R. at pp. 52-54 and 116-
118) and the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision which granted 
plaintiffs' motion and denied Reta Chadaz's motion. (See R. at pp. 
295-297 and Addendum E) . Reta Chadaz then moved to have the 
Memorandum Decision amended, so as to clarify the grounds for the 
court's ruling (See R. at pp. 298-307 and 315-326), and a second 
Memorandum Decision was issued by the court (See R. at pp. 327-331 
and Addendum F) . A Notice of Appeal was then filed by Reta Chadaz 
(see R. at pp. 335-340) wherein she sought review of the trial 
court's grant of Summary Judgment to plaintiffs. 
The following facts are relevant to the issues presented for 
review: 
1. Floyd and Reta Chadaz, sellers, owned approximately 47.12 
acres which they sold on contract to Heritage Park Partners, 
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buyers, by contract dated May 12, 1980, (See R. at pp. 124-136 and 
Addendum A). 
2. In keeping with this contract this entire property was 
placed in trust with Hillam Abstracting and Insurance Agency by 
Warranty Deed dated and filed May 12, 1980 at 4:10 p.m. (See R. at 
p. 137). 
3. On the same day (May 12, 1980) a Warranty Deed was made 
by Hillam to buyers (Heritage Park Partners) covering all of the 
property owned by Chadaz fronting on Main Street in Tremonton, 
Utah. This deed was recorded May 12, 1980 at 4:12 p.m. The parcel 
includes the 1.58 acres property in dispute. (See R. at p. 138). 
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4. The buyers (Heritage Park Partners) subsequently 
defaulted on said agreement. After negotiations, a Supplemental 
Agreement dated November 25, 1980, was entered into to assist the 
buyers (Heritage Park Partners) in being able to continue in the 
purchase of the property. (See R. at pp. 139-145 and Addendum B). 
5. As one of the conditions of the Supplemental Agreement 
the buyers (Heritage Park Partners) agreed: 
"that when the property fronting on Main Street, which 
has been released by the seller to the buyer, has been 
sold by the buyer to a third party that there will be a 
reservation of a 66 foot wide roadway from Main Street to 
the seller's remaining property." 
(See R. at 141 and Addendum B). 
6. After entering into the Supplemental Agreement the buyers 
(Heritage Park Partners) began doing business as Heritage Park 
Plaza, Inc. This was a corporation owned by all of the same 
individuals who were the partners in Heritage Park Partners. (See 
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R. at p. 266 paragraph 6; R. at pp. 270-272). 
7. As a result of the change from a partnership to a 
corporation, a Warranty Deed from Heritage Park Partners to 
Heritage Park Plaza, Inc., was recorded December 9, 1980 at 3:05 
p.m., covering the 1.58 acres previously conveyed by Chadaz to 
Heritage Park Partners. (See R. at p. 261-262 and Addendum C). 
8. In accordance with the Supplemental Agreement, when the 
buyers (Heritage Park Plaza, Inc., formerly Heritage Park Partners) 
sold the property in question, 1.58 acres, to Villatek Inc., the 
Special Warranty Deed to Villatek contained the following 
provisions: 
"Subject To A Right-Of-Way Over The East 66 Feet Of Said 
Property, For The Purpose Of A Proposed Road." 
This Special Warranty Deed was recorded December 9, 1980, at 3:10 
p.m. This was after the Supplemental Agreement had been entered 
into. This Special Warranty Deed has remained of record since that 
date. (See R. at pp. 263-264 and Addendum D). 
9. Despite the Supplemental Agreement the buyers (Heritage 
Park Plaza, Inc., formerly Heritage Park Partners) again defaulted 
and all of the property, with the exception of the 1.58 acres of 
property sold to Villatek, was returned to Chadaz. (See R. at p. 
85, par. 11). 
10. Some time later, by Quit Claim Deed dated May 2, 1996, 
recorded October 8, 1996, Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. conveyed to 
Reta Chadaz all of the rights it had previously reserved in said 
right of way. (See R. at pp. 148-149). 
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11. Reta Chadaz presently owns both the right of way and 
approximately 35 acres to the south of said right of way which 
abuts to said right of way. (See R. at p. 21, par. 9 and p. 22 
par. 11). 
12. At the time the plaintiffs received actual notice of the 
claimed easement the only impovements that had been made on the 
disputed easement was "a fence had been removed and some gravel had 
been placed on said property". (See R. at p. 100 par. 4). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court ruling was based upon the pleadings, memoranda of 
authorities in support of motions for summary judgments submitted 
by both parties and arguments of counsel. No other evidence was 
presented. On a review of a summary judgment the party against 
whom the judgment has been granted is entitled to have all the 
facts presented, and all the inferences fairly arising therefrom, 
considered in a light most favorable to him. 
Defendant's position is that there is a genuine issue as to a 
material fact concerning each of the points raised by the 
plaintiffs. Briefly these points of the plaintiffs and the 
responses of the defendant are as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs' Point - plaintiffs are bona fide purchasers 
without notice. 
Defendant's Response - the reservation of the disputed 
easement was made by a Special Warranty Deed recorded 
December 9, 1980, and has remained of record since that 
date. The plaintiffs acquired their title by Warranty 
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Deed recorded July 29, 1993. The plaintiffs are charged 
with constructive notice of said easement. 
Plaintiffs7 Point - dominant and servient parcels were 
separated and no longer abut each other. 
Defendant's Response - this defendant still owns the 
property (approximately 35 acres) abutting the south end 
of the disputed right of way. The reservation of the 
right of way was for the express purpose of providing 
access from Main Street to the approximately 35 acres. 
Defendant contends that she owns the right of way and the 
acreage to which it leads and these two parcels do abut 
to each other. 
Plaintiffs7 Point - there was no consideration to support 
the express grant of the easement. 
Defendant7s Response - the consideration for the easement 
was the fact that the Buyers of the property were in 
default and the Sellers (defendant herein) granted the 
Buyers additional time to make payments and as part of 
the consideration for this, the Buyers agreed to the 
reservation of the easement (over the land that had 
already been deeded by the Sellers to the Buyers) . This 
access was very important to the defendant. This 
remained true whether the Buyers built the road or 
whether upon repossession the defendant built the road. 
Plaintiffs7 Point - the defendant had abandoned the 
easement. 
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Defendant's Response - this was an express recorded right 
of way, not a right of way by prescription. An easement 
acquired by grant or reservation cannot be lost by mere 
nonuse for any length of time, no matter how great. 
There was no intent of the defendant to abandon the 
easement. 
Plaintiffs' Point - defendant is barred by equitable 
estoppel from claiming an easement. 
Defendant' s Response - there have been no false 
representations or concealment of natural facts by the 
defendant. The plaintiffs had constructive notice of the 
easement and certainly had a means of knowledge of the 
true facts. Both of these facts make the equitable 
estoppel doctrine inapplicable. 
Plaintiffs' Point - this was an easement in gross and 
could not be transferred to subsequent owners. 
Defendant's Response - this was an easement for a road to 
serve as access to a subdivision. It was to specifically 
benefit a parcel of land. It was not a personal right 
(i.e. access to an individual for hunting or fishing). 
It was, therefore, not an easement in gross. 
Plaintiffs' Point - the easement was no longer needed. 
Defendant's Response - this is a recorded easement. It 
is needed as much today as it was when it was recorded. 
It gives direct access to Main Street in Tremonton, Utah. 
There is no such direct access to the defendant's 
10 
remaining property without this easement. 
8. Plaintiffs' Point - a grantor cannot reserve an easement 
to a third party in a deed. 
Defendant's Response - this case does not involve a third 
party (stranger to the deed or third party beneficiary). 
Heritage Park Partners, the original buyer, changed their 
form of doing business from a partnership to a 
corporation known as Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. The new 
corporation continued to carry out the obligations of the 
old partnership. The Supplemental Agreement, the deed 
from the partnership to the corporation and the deed from 
the corporation to Villatek (in which the reservation of 
the right of way was made) and the quit claim deed from 
the corporation to the defendant all support the 
defendant's position. 
9. Plaintiffs' Point - the trial court's first Memorandum 
Decision which stated "For the reasons stated in the 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment the same is 
granted" is proper and need not be amended. 
Defendant's Response - as set forth in Rule 52(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the trial court is required 
to issue a brief written statement of the grounds for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rule 56 when the 
motion is based upon more than one ground. Clearly in 




THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT AS TO WHETHER OR NOT 
THERE IS AN EASEMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT CHADAZ 
OVER THE PROPERTY OWNED BY PLAINTIFFS 
There are several disputed and material facts which, when 
viewed in the light most favorable to Reta Chadaz indicate there is 
a genuine dispute as to whether or not she has an easement over 
plaintiffs' property. These disputed facts are set forth below and 
clearly establish that summary judgment is not proper. 
A. There Is A Genuine Issue As To Whether Or Not Plaintiffs 
Are Bona Fide Purchasers Without Notice. 
The plaintiffs argue that they were "without notice of the 
easement" (See plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Plaintiffs7 Motion For Summary Judgment R. at pp. 58-
59). This is contrary to the Special Warranty Deed which created 
the easement and which was recorded December 9, 1980, long before 
plaintiffs obtained the property. (See Special Warranty Deed 
attached to Defendant's Answer and Counterclaim as Exhibit "A" R. 
at pp. 25-26 and Addendum D). 
Section 57-3-2(1) of the Utah Code provides in relevant part, 
that once a document is properly recorded it "shall from the time 
of filing with the appropriate county recorder, impart notice to 
all persons of their [its] contents." Utah Code Ann. Sec. 57-3-2-
(1) (1953 as amended) (emphasis added). 
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Accordingly, since the Special Warranty Deed has remained of record 
since December 9, 1980, the plaintiffs are charged with 
constructive notice of the contents of said deed. In addition to 
the constructive notice, plaintiffs were put on actual notice of 
this defendant's interest in the property prior to any 
improvements, except removal of fence and placing of gravel and 
grass on the property. (See Affidavit of Maurice Staples R. at pp. 
99-103). 
B. There Is A Genuine Issue As To Whether Or Not The 
Dominant And Servient Parcels No Longer 2\but Each Other. 
The defendant, Reta Chadaz, still owns the same property which 
the right-of-way was established to benefit and this property abuts 
to the right-of-way. 
The chain of title to the Chadaz property that was involved in 
the original sale is as follows: 
1. Floyd Chadaz and Reta Chadaz conveyed by Warranty 
Deed to Hillam Abstracting and Insurance Agency, Inc., a 
Utah Corporation, Trustee, pursuant to a Trust Agreement 
dated the 12th day of May, 1980 (recorded in Book 331, 
Page 977, 5/12/80). This deed conveyed 47.12 acres. 
(See R. at p. 137). 
2. Hillam Abstracting and Insurance Agency, Inc., conveyed 
by Warranty Deed to Heritage Park Partners (recorded in 
Book 331, Page 978, 5/12/80). This covers approximately 
1.58 acres being all of the Chadaz property located on 
Main Street. (See R. at p. 138). 
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3. Heritage Park Partners conveyed by Warranty Deed to 
Heritage Park Plaza, Inc., a Utah Corporation (dated 
10/24/80, recorded 12/9/80 at 3:05 p.m. in Book 339, Page 
678 as Instrument No. 82457H). This covered 1.58 acres. 
(See R. at pp. 261-262 and Addendum C). 
4. Heritage Park Plaza, Inc., a Utah Corporation conveyed by 
Special Warranty Deed to Villatek Inc., a Utah 
Corporation (dated 10/24/80 recorded 12/9/80 at 3:10 p.m. 
in Book 339, Page 680 as Instrument No. 82458H). This 
covered the 1.58 acres and contained the provision 
"Subject To A Right-Of-Way Over The East 66 Feet Of Said 
Property, For the Purpose Of A Proposed Road". (Emphasis 
added). This is where the right-of-way in question is 
first recorded. (See R. at pp. 146-147 and Addendum D) . 
It is important to note the date, recording date, time of 
recording, book, page and instrument number of paragraphs 
3 and 4 above. Both of these deeds are dated 10/24/80. 
The deed from Heritage Park Partners to Heritage Park 
Plaza, Inc. was recorded 12/9/80 at 3:05 p.m. in Book 
339, Page 678 as Instrument No. 82457H. The deed from 
Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. to Villatek, Inc. was recorded 
12/19/80 at 3:10 p.m. in Book 339, Page 680 as Instrument 
No. 82458H. The second deed being recorded immediately 
after the first. 
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5. Villatek, Inc. conveyed by Warranty Deed to Bradley J. 
Jorgensen (recorded in Book 355, Page 217 dated 2/25/82 
recorded 2/26/82). There was no mention of the Right-of-
Wav in the conveyance. (Emphasis added). There is no 
further mention of the right-of-way on the county records 
until the Quit Claim Deed from Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. 
to Reta Chadaz (dated 05/02/96 was recorded 10/03/96 in 
Book 633, Page 1112; see R. at pp. 104-105). This covers 
the right-of-way only. 
6. Hillam Abstracting and Insurance Agency, Inc., Trustee, 
conveyed by Special Warranty Deed to Floyd Chadaz 
(recorded in Book 349, Page 596 dated September 1, 1981 
recorded September 3, 1981). This covers all of the 
property that had not been conveyed to Heritage Park 
Plaza, Inc. by Hillams as Trustee. This included 
approximately 35 acres adjacent to the south end of the 
right-of-way that is in dispute in this lawsuit. 
The right of way does abut the property owned by the 
defendant-appellant, Reta Chadaz, and is the only direct access 
from her prime development property to Main Street. 
C. There Is A Genuine Issue As To Whether Or Not Any 
Consideration Supported The Express Grant Of Easement. 
The plaintiffs contend there was no consideration given by 
this defendant to the purchasers for the granting of this easement. 
An agreement dated May 12, 1980 (See R. at pp. 124-136 and 
Addendum A) was entered into between Floyd Chadaz and Reta Chadaz 
as Sellers and Heritage Park Partners as the Buyers. This was for 
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the purchase of 47.12 acres of land, including the property in 
dispute in this case. The Buyers were unable to meet their 
obligations under this original agreement and were at risk of 
losing all of their rights under the contract. All of the Sellers' 
land which fronted on Main Street had already been deeded to the 
Buyers. 
As part of the consideration for granting the Buyers 
additional time to perform on their contract, the Sellers entered 
into a Supplemental Agreement dated November 25, 1980 (See R. at 
pp. 139-145 and Addendum B) . Part of the consideration being given 
by the Buyers to the Sellers was to be a reservation of a 66 foot 
wide roadway (see paragraph 4 of said agreement) which was stated 
as follows: 
"The buyer agrees that when the property fronting on 
Main Street, which has been released by the seller to the 
buyer, has been sold by the buyer to a third party there 
will be a reservation of a 66 foot wide roadway from Main 
Street to the sellers7 remaining property . . . " 
(See Addendum B). 
It is defendant's position that there was consideration given 
by both parties for the Supplemental Agreement. The sellers 
extended the time for payments and the buyers agreed to the 
reservation of the easement. 
D. There Is A Genuine Issue As To Whether Or Not The 
Defendant Chadaz Abandoned The Easement 
The easement in this case was created by the reservation of 
the right-of-way for a road set forth in the Special Warranty Deed 
(See R. at pp. 263-264 and Addendum D) . This is not an easement 
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obtained by use or prescription. Since a reservation is the 
creation in behalf of the grantor of a new right issuing out of the 
thing granted, an easement appurtenant to the grantors7 remaining 
land may be created by reservation. A reservation of an easement 
is equivalent, for the purpose of creation of the easement, to an 
express grant of the easement by the grantee of the lands (25 
Am.Jur. 2d, Easements and Licenses Section 19). 
In Utah an easement or right of way may not be lost by non-use 
alone if it is gained by conveyance. Western Gateway Storage Co. 
v. Treseder. 567 P2d 181, 182 (Utah 1977). An actual intent to 
abandon the easement must be evident and this must be proved by 
clear and convincing actions releasing the ownership and right of 
use. Id. " . . . [N]onuse will not extinguish an easement created 
by express grant, no matter how long the easement has gone unused." 
(25 Am.Jur. 2d, Easements and Licenses, Section 114) 
As previously set forth, the easement has remained of record 
since it was recorded on December 9, 1980. The only evidence 
before the court is non-use of the easement by Chadaz. This is 
clearly not sufficient to show an abandonment of the easement. 
E. There Is A Genuine Issue As To Whether or Not Defendant 
Chadaz Is Barred By Equitable Estoppel From Claiming An 
Easement. 
Whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies depends 
upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. There can 
be no equitable estoppel if any essential element thereof is 
lacking or not satisfactorily proved. 
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The elements of equitable estoppel as related to the party to 
the estoppel, are: 
1. conduct which amounts to a false representation 
or concealment of material facts, or, at least, which is 
calculated to convey the impression that the facts are 
otherwise than, and inconsistent with those which the 
party subsequently attempts to assert; 
2. the intention, or at least the expectation, 
that such conduct shall be acted upon by, or influences 
the other party or other persons; and 
3. knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real 
facts. 
28 Am.Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver §35, (emphasis added). 
The elements of equitable estoppel as related to the party 
claiming the estoppel, are: 
1. lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge 
of the truth as to the facts in question; 
2. reliance, in good faith, upon the conduct or 
statements of the party to be estopped; 
3. action or inaction based thereon of such 
character as to change the position and status of the 
party claiming the estoppel to his injury, detriment, or 
prejudice. 
28 Am.Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver §35, (emphasis added). 
The elements of equitable estoppel are not present in our 
case. There was never any representation by Reta Chadaz, that 
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there was no easement (See Answer of defendant to Plaintiffs' 
Complaint, paragraph 8, R. at p. 19). The property, consisting of 
the easement, was apparently purchased by the plaintiffs on July 
23, 1998. (See R. at p. 7). Shortly thereafter plaintiff, Dean 
Potter, had been advised of the easement and had been furnished a 
copy of an Agreement relating to the easement (See R. at pp. 99-
103). This was done prior to any improvements upon said property 
except the removal of a fence and placing of some gravel upon said 
property (See R. at p. 100 paragraph 4). 
Again, plaintiffs had constructive notice of the easement, the 
recorded Special Warranty Deed (See R. at pp. 263-264 and Addendum 
D) and actual notice prior to construction on said easement (See R. 
at pp. 99-103) . They certainly had a means of knowledge of the 
true facts. As to whether plaintiffs acted in good faith is 
certainly a fact question to be decided by the court or jury and 
not proper for a Summary Judgment. 
F. There Is A Genuine Issue As To Whether Or Not The 
Easement Was An Easement In Gross And Could Not Be 
Transferred To Subsequent owners. 
The easement in this case is an appurtenant easement. An 
appurtenant easement is one whose benefits serve a parcel of land; 
more exactly it serves the owner of that land in a way that cannot 
be separated from his rights in the land. Abbott v. Nampa School 
District No. 181, 119 Idaho 544, 808 P. 2d 1289 (Idaho 1991) 
(emphasis added). 
The easement in this case is not an easement in gross. An 
easement in gross is mere personal interest in or right to the use 
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of the land of another. It is attached to, and vested in, the 
person to whom it is granted. (25 Am.Jur. 2d Easements and 
Licenses §11 (emphasis added)). 
Whether an easement in a given case is appurtenant or in gross 
depends mainly on the nature of the right and the intention of the 
parties. (25 Am.Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses §12). Easements in 
gross are not favored by the courts, however, and an easement will 
never be presumed personal when it may fairly be construed as 
appurtenant to some other estate. Thus, if an easement is in its 
nature an appropriate and useful adjunct of the land conveyed 
having in view the intention of the parties as to its use, and 
there is nothing to show that the parties intended it to be a mere 
personal right, it should be held to be an easement appurtenant and 
not an easement in gross. If doubt exists as to its real nature, 
an easement is presumed to be appurtenant and not in gross. (25 
Am.Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses §12). 
The facts in our case are that a right of way was reserved for 
"a right-of-way over the east 66 feet of said property, for the 
purpose of a proposed road" (See R. at p. 264). There was nothing 
personal about the right of way; it was and still is appurtenant to 
the dominant tenement and necessary for direct access from Main 
Street to the prime development property of the defendant, Reta 
Chadaz. 
G. There Is A Genuine Issue As To Whether Or Not The 
Easement Was No Longer Needed. 
The easement as provided for in the Supplemental Agreement 
(See R. at pp. 106-111 and Addendum B) and as reserved in the 
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Special Warranty Deed (See R. at pp. 97-98 and Addendum D) gave to 
the owner of the property to the south (approximately 35 acres) 
direct access to Main Street. This greatly enhanced the value of 
the property to the South. This was true whether the buyers of the 
property developed it and paid it off or whether the property was 
returned to the sellers (Chadaz) by default. 
There is nothing in the record to indicate that Tremonton City 
would approve the subdivision without the easement in question. 
The fact that the roadway was not completed with curb, gutter, 
sidewalks, sewer and pavement prior to October 1, 1981, certainly 
did not eliminate the need for the roadway. Just because part of 
the consideration may have failed does not mean that the balance of 
the consideration (the right of way itself) should fail. 
The purpose of the Supplemental Agreement (See R. at p. 107 
paragraph 4 and Addendum B) was to correct an oversight that had 
been made by Chadaz, that is, failure to reserve a right of way. 
The agreement was made with the then owner of the property over 
which the right of way was to pass. The then owner had every right 
to reserve a right of way for a road and that right of way could be 
used by any developer of the property for the purpose of developing 
the property. 
This easement was needed then and it is still needed now. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN APPLYING 
THE LAW SO AS TO DETERMINE THERE IS NO EASEMENT 
IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT CHADAZ OVER THE 
PROPERTY OWNED BY THE PLAINTIFFS. 
The plaintiffs' use of several different legal theories in 
support of their motion for summary judgment, together with the two 
separate and somewhat confusing Memorandum Decisions issued by the 
trial court, make it difficult, if not impossible, to determine the 
reasoning behind the trial court's grant of summary judgment.1 
However, since none of the legal theories relied upon by the 
plaintiff justify a summary judgment, the trial court erred in its 
interpretation of the law. Set forth below are the reasons summary 
judgment was improper. 
A. The Easement Reserved By Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. 
(Previously Heritage Park Partners) Was In Fulfillment Of 
A Contractual Obligation To Chadaz And Created A Valid 
Easement In Favor Of Chadaz. 
Plaintiffs have argued that since Chadaz conveyed the 1.58 
acres to Heritage Park Partners without reserving an easement, such 
an easement could not be subsequently created in favor of 
Chadaz. This argument is based upon the so called "stranger to the 
deed" legal theory and assumes that Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. was 
an unrelated third party which had no contractual obligations or 
1
 Neither decision relies upon any specific legal authority 
(other than a reference that plaintiffs7 reliance on the Wade case 
"is not entirely justified" (see R. at p. 296)). The first 
decision seems to adopt plaintiffs7"shotgun" approach by summarily 
referring to the "reasons stated in the plaintiffs7 Motion for 
Summary Judgment" (See R. at p. 296 and Addendum E) and the second 
decision briefly mentions almost every theory relied upon by 
plaintiffs (S£e R. at pp. 327-331 and Addendum F). 
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connections to Chadaz. 
As previously set forth, Heritage Park Partners entered into 
an agreement with Chadaz to purchase property owned by Chadaz. 
After a default had occurred and before the sale was completed, a 
supplemental agreement was entered into between Heritage Park 
Partners and Chadaz wherein Heritage Park Partners specifically 
agreed to create an easement across the 1.58 acres in favor of 
Chadaz. Before this easement was created, Heritage Park Partners 
became Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. was not 
an unrelated third party, but rather the successor to Heritage Park 
Partners. 
It was the intention of both Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. and 
Heritage Park Partners to fulfill the obligation to Chadaz in 
accordance with the Supplemental Agreement. That obligation was, 
in fact, fulfilled when Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. reserved the 66 
foot right of way in the Special Warranty Deed (See Addendum F). 
This is evidenced by the following facts which were submitted 
to the trial court: 
1. The Affidavit of James C. Kaiserman (See R. at 
pp. 270-272) clearly explains that: "The owners of 
Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. were the same as the partners 
of Heritage Park Partners11 (See R. at p. 271 paragraph 4) 
(emphasis added). The Affidavit states: "The deed 
signed by Heritage Park Partners, grantor, to Heritage 
Park Plaza, Inc., as grantees, filed December 9, 1980, in 
Book 336, Page 678, was signed by all of the partners of 
23 
Heritage Park Partners" (See R. at p. 271 paragraph 3) 
(emphasis added). 
2. Kaizerman/s Affidavit further states, "The deed 
signed by Heritage Park Plaza, Inc., grantor, to Villatek 
Inc., grantee filed December 9, 1980, in Book 336, Page 
680, was signed by James C. Kaiserman, President and 
attested to by Ronald Stout, Secretary." (See R. at p. 
171 paragraph 5) (emphasis added). 
3. The Affidavit of Clark M. Hillam (See R. at pp. 
265-269) confirms that of Kaiserman as follows, "6. It 
is my further recollection that the Buyers, Heritage Park 
Partners and the owners of Heritage Park Plaza, Inc., 
were all the same individuals and this fact is supported 
by the deeds and other documents." (See R. at p. 266 
paragraph 6). 
4. It is clear from an examination of the two deeds 
referred to in the Kaiserman Affidavit (See R. at p. 271, 
paragraphs 3 and 5) that they were both: 
(a) Dated October 24, 1980; 
(b) Recorded December 9, 1980; 
- one in Book 339 - Pgs. 678-679 
- the other in Book 3 39 - Pgs. 680-681 
- one as Instrument No. 82457H 
- the other as Instrument No. 82458H 
- one recorded at 3:05 p.m. 
- the other recorded at 3:10 p.m. 
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It has been widely recognized that "where it appears that the 
property of a business operated by a partnership or individual is 
simply transferred to the corporation without consideration other 
than corporate stock issued to the partners or individuals, or the 
corporation is, in fact, merely a continuation of the old business 
under a different name, it is liable for the debts of the pre-
existing business; at least a presumption arises that the 
corporation has assumed such debts." (18 Am.Jur. 2d Corporations 
§53) . "A corporation organized to take over the business of a 
partnership or of an individual may assume the liabilities of the 
partnership or the individual and thereupon become liable to the 
partnership creditors. The assumption may, according to some 
authorities, be either express, or implied from the circumstances, 
and proved by any competent evidence which will establish it." (18 
Am.Jur. 2d Corporations §54). 
The plaintiffs' argument that summary judgment should be 
granted because Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. cannot reserve a right of 
way to Chadaz, who is a stranger on the deed is not justified. 
Plaintiffs rely on the case of "In the Matter of the Estate of 
Thomson v. Wade" (See R. at pp. 246-249) hereinafter referred to as 
Wade. The facts and rationale of the Wade case show that it simply 
does not apply. 
In Wade the court carefully pointed out that no easement was 
reserved by the grantor when the land benefitted by the easement 
was conveyed. The grantor had failed to reserve an express 
easement until the time when the land burdened by the easement was 
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conveyed, at a time when the grantor no longer owned the land 
benefitted by the easement. Consequently, the court noted "[i]t is 
axiomatic that [the grantor] could not create an easement 
benefitting land which he did not own." (Wade at 310) (citations 
omitted). 
In the case before the court, defendant, Chadaz, has always 
owned and still owns the land benefitted by the easement. Although 
the defendant, Chadaz, did convey the land burdened by the 
easement, she never did convey the land benefitted by the easement 
due to the default of the buyers, and this land has never been 
conveyed. After the buyers had received the land burdened by the 
easement, and in an express effort to salvage their attempt to 
purchase the land benefitted by the easement, the buyers agreed to 
expressly reserve the easement in the event they conveyed the land 
now burdened by the easement to another party. Subsequently and in 
accordance with this agreement, the easement was reserved even 
though the potential buyers were never able to complete their 
purchase of the land benefitted by the easement, which therefore, 
remained the property of the defendant, Chadaz. 
Clearly, from the facts of our case, it was the intent of the 
partnership and the corporation, as well as Chadaz, that the 
corporation take over the obligation of the partnership to reserve 
a 66 foot right of way as provided in the Supplemental Agreement. 
(See R. at p. 107 paragraph 4 and Addendum B) . Defendant, Chadaz, 
therefore, created by means of the Supplemental Agreement the 
express easement benefitting land which she owned. There was no 
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attempt to reserve an easement in favor of a third party and the 
rationale of the Wade case simply does not apply. Based upon the 
foregoing it is defendant, Chadaz's, position that the stranger to 
the deed concept (or the court's suggestion of third party 
beneficiary) does not apply to our case. 
Furthermore, even if the "stranger to the deed" concept were 
to apply in this case, the law in Utah would not follow Wade but 
would follow Willard v. First Church of Christ. Scientist, 
Pacifica. 498 P.2d 987 (Calif. 1972), (See R. at pp. 257-259; See 
also copy of case R. at pp. 273-278), hereinafter referred to as 
Willard. That case provides that effect should be given to the 
grantor's intent in creating an easement. It specifically states, 
"In general, therefore, grants are to be interpreted in the same 
way as other contracts and not according to rigid feudal 
standards." (See R. at p. 275 right hand column). Further quotes 
from that case are as follows: 
"The common law rule conflicts with the modern 
approach to construing deeds because it can frustrate the 
grantor's intent. Moreover, it produces an inequitable 
result because the original grantee has presumably paid 
a reduced price for title to the encumbered property." 
"The highest courts of two states have already 
eliminated the rule altogether, rather than repealing it 
piecemeal by evasion. . . Since the rule may frustrate 
the grantor's intention in some cases even though riddled 
with exceptions, we follow the lead of Kentucky and 
Oregon and abandon it entirely." 
Willard at 275, 277 (emphasis added). 
The case of Aszmus v. Nelson, 743 P. 2d 377 (Alaska 1987) 
approved "the general rule that deeds must be read to ascertain the 
intent of the grantor." The court then went on to approve the 
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rational of the Willard case, infra.# and to specifically reject 
the Wade case relied upon by the plaintiffs. (See R. at pp. 279-
282) , 
B. An Express And Recorded Easement Cannot Be Abandoned By 
Nonuse 
Plaintiffs argue that any easement in favor of Chadaz was 
abandoned by her when she failed to build a roadway or use the 
easement for "over sixteen(16) years" (See R. at 61). Although an 
easement can be abandoned by nonuse, an easement gained by 
conveyance "may not be lost by non-use alone" but "an actual intent 
to abandon [must] be evident." Western Gateway Storage Co. v. 
Treseder. 567 P.2d 181, 182 (Utah 1977). Furthermore, any intent 
to abandon must be shown by clear and convincing actions. Id. at 
182. This principle has been widely recognized by many courts. 
(25 Am.Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses §114). 
In this case, Chadaz's easement is an express easement which 
was gained by conveyance from Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. It cannot 
be abandoned by non-use alone, and plaintiffs did not and cannot 
point to any undisputed "clear and convincing" actions by Chadaz 
evidencing any intent to abandon the easement. Summary judgment on 
this basis was, therefore, improper. 
C The Recording Of An Express Reservation Of Easement 
Imparted Notice To Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs claim that they own the property free of Chadaz7s 
easement since they purchased it without knowledge (actual or 
constructive) of the existence of an easement (see R. at p. 58). 
This argument completely ignores the undisputed fact that the 
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easement was properly recorded in the Box Elder County Recorder's 
Office. 
§57-3-2 of the Utah Code provides, in relevant part: 
Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in 
the manner prescribed by this title . . . shall, from the 
time of filing with the appropriate county recorder, 
impart notice to all persons of their contents. 
Utah Code Ann. §57-3-2 (1953 as amended) (emphasis added). 
Consequently, "One who deals with real property is charged with 
notice of what is shown by the records of the county recorder of 
the county in which the real property is situated." Crompton v. 
Jensen. 78 Ut. 55, 1 P.2d 242 (1931). "Whatever is notice enough 
to excite attention and put the party on his guard and call for 
inquiry is notice of everything to which such inquiry might have 
led. When a person has sufficient information to lead him to a 
fact, he shall be deemed conversant of it." O'Reilly v. McLean, 84 
Ut. 551, 37 P.2d 770 (Utah 1934); Lawlev v. Hickenlooper. 61 Ut. 
298, 212 P. 526 (Utah 1922); Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. at page 
141, 25 L. Ed. 807. 
The reservation of the right of way was dated October 24, 
1980, recorded December 9, 1980, in Book 339, Pages 680-681, 
Instrument No. 82458H, at 3:10 p.m. (See R. at pp. 25-26 and 
Addendum D). The filing of the Special Warranty Deed subject to 
the reservation of the right of way was sufficient to impart notice 
to all persons, including plaintiffs, from the date of the 
recording. Plaintiffs cannot be bona fide purchasers without 
notice, and summary judgment on this legal theory was not proper. 
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D. The Doctrine Of Equitable Estoppel Does Not Extinguish 
Chadaz's Express And Recorded Easement. 
Plaintiffs claim that Chadaz is barred from claiming her 
easement by the doctrine of equitable estoppel (See R. at P. 62) . 
In making such a claim, plaintiffs again ignore the fact that 
Chadaz's easement had been expressly conveyed and recorded. 
With respect to the doctrine of estoppel in connection with 
interests in real estate, "it is generally well established that a 
person cannot assert an estoppel on the basis of the failure of an 
owner of an interest in real estate to disclose such interest while 
the aggrieved fcarty was carrying on some transaction relating to 
such property, if the person seeking to establish the estoppel has 
failed to avail himself of the constructive notice afforded by the 
public records." (28 Am.Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver §96) . In this 
regard, "[w]hen the avenues of information are equally open to both 
parties, there will be no bar. Nor is the party holding the title 
bound to seek the other and inform him of his rights when he is in 
no default. The owner of land, having his title duly recorded, has 
given all the information to the purchaser which the law requires." 
28 Am.Jur. 2d. Estoppel and Waiver §90 N. 12 (1966) (emphasis 
added); Mills v. Graves, 38 111. 455; See also Porter v. Wheeler, 
17 So. 221. Additionally, " . . . the mere fact that a person has 
ascertained that a transaction relative to property in which he has 
an interest is contemplated by other parties does not impose upon 
him the duty of disclosing that interest. The nonexistence of any 
duty under such circumstance is inferable for an additional reason 
where the nature and extent of the interest held by the party 
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sought to be estopped are ascertainable by an inspection of the 
public records. Indeed, because of the doctrine of constructive 
notice, there is little duty outside the avoidance of affirmative 
misleading acts, which is imposed upon the holder of an interest in 
real property, which interest is disclosed by the public record." 
28 Am.Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver §90 (emphasis added). 
There is no factual dispute that the reservation of the right 
of way was made a matter of record December 9, 1980 (See R. at pp. 
25-26 and Addendum D) . The plaintiffs purchased the land in 
question on or about July 23, 1993 (See R. at p. 7) , and therefore, 
had constructive notice of the easement. With such notice, 
plaintiffs cannot use the doctrine of estoppel to avoid Chadaz's 
easement. 
E. The Conveyance Of The Property By Villatek 
Without Reservation Of Chadaz's Easement, Did Not 
Extinguish The Easement. 
Villatek could not convey away more than it had. It received 
the property by Special Warranty Deed (See R. at pp. 25-26 and 
Addendum D). It was "Subject To A Right-Of-Way Over The East 66 
Feet Of Said Property, For The Purpose Of A Road." Villatek 
conveyed the property away by Warranty Deed (See R. at p. 169-170). 
There was no mention of the Right-of-Way in this conveyance. 
Villatek's failure to mention the right of way clearly cannot and 
should not destroy the right of way. 
It is noted here that "First American Title Ins. Co. (on Title 
Policy)" was named as a party defendant. Attention is called to 
the transcript of videotaped hearing pg. 31 lines 1-17: 
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"The Court: Before you leave that, I assume he 
purchased this land with title coverage?" 
"Mr. Grant: Yes." 
"The Court: Why is the title insurance carrier not a 
party?" 
"Mr. Grant: They are." 
"Mr. Hadfield: They have paid. Your Honor." 
"The Court: I assumed that might be the case. It raises 
a question of equity, then, but go ahead." 
"Mr. Hadfield: The question is why did they pay, also?" 
"The Court: I don't know whether that should 
control the court." 
"Mr. Hadfield: No. it does not. 
"The Court: But the fact that they paid may affect the 
issue relative to equity. But go ahead." 
It is obvious the title insurance company did not believe that 
Villatek's failure to mention the Right-of-Way in its conveyance 
did, in fact, do away with the right of way. 
The fact that the title company failed to mention the "right-
of-way" in its title policy does not help the plaintiffs. The 
right of way was a matter of record and the fact that it was not 
mentioned in the title policy was not the fault of the defendant, 
Chadaz. 
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P. The Easement Reserved By Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. Was In 
Consideration Of The extension Of The Sales Agreement 
Between Chadaz And Heritage Park Partners, And The 
Subsequent Default On The Supplemental Agreement Does Not 
Nullify The Easement 
The parties negotiated a Supplemental Agreement dated November 
25, 1980, which Supplemental Agreement contained the following 
provision in paragraph 4: 
"The buyer agrees that the property fronting on Main 
Street, which has been released by the seller to the 
buyer, has been sold by the buyer to a third party that 
there will be a reservation of a 66 foot wide roadway 
from Main street to the seller's remaining property 
it 
• • • 
(See R. at p. 107 and Addendum B) . This provision of the agreement 
was fulfilled by the buyer (Heritage Park Plaza,Inc. formerly 
Heritage ParJc Partners) . On December 9, 1980 the Special Warranty 
Deed (See R. at pp. 25-26 and Addendum D) was recorded, which deed 
described a parcel of ground containing 1.58 acres and underneath 
the description provided as follows: "Subject To A Right-Of-Way 
Over The East 66 Feet Of Said Property For The Purpose Of A 
Proposed Road." 
Clearly the most important purpose of the right of way for a 
road was to maintain an access to Main Street for the balance of 
the property lying to the south of said right of way. The fact 
that the then current developer did not construct a road did not 
diminish the importance of the right of way to the owners of the 
property to the south or to any future prospective developer. It 
is still as important and necessary today as it was when it was 
created. The buyers (Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. formerly Heritage 
Park Partners) gave up an easement in consideration of Chadaz 
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allowing an extension or alternative to the default. The 
subsequent default on the Supplemental Agreement cannot and does 
not affect this bargained for exchange. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE AMENDED 
OR MADE ADDITIONAL FINDINGS IN GRANTING 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The trial court in its first Memorandum Decision dated 
September 19, 1997 held: 
"Without reciting all of the issues and the basis 
for decision, the court acknowledges that perhaps holding 
the Wade case (In the Matter of the Estate of; Thompson 
v. Wade, 509 N.E. 2nd 309 (New York 1987) is not entirely 
justified, but neither is the Defendant's' reliance 
helpful. *Stranger to the deed7 principles are not 
particularly beneficial to either party." 
"For the reasons stated in the Plaintiff's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, the same is granted. The motion 
for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant is denied. 
Counsel for the Plaintiff is directed to prepare a formal 
Order in conformance herewith. 
(See R. at pp. 295-296 (emphasis added and Addendum E). 
Unfortunately, plaintiffs had raised at least eleven different 
points in their Motion for Summary Judgment (See R. at pp. 302-
303) . 
When the court ruled, "for the reasons stated in the 
plaintiffs' motion . . . the same is granted", Chadaz was left in 
a complete dilemma as to the basis of the court's ruling. 
Consequently, the defendant filed her Verified Motion For Amendment 
To Memorandum Decision, together with Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities. (See R. at pp. 298-307). 
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The trial court's second Memorandum Decision dated October 21, 
1997 (see R. at pp. 367-331 and Addendum F), while elaborating on 
some points, still concluded, "as stated in the Court's original 
Order in this case and as found in the original Memorandum 
Decision, the Motion for Summary Judgment brought by the Plaintiffs 
is granted and this Memorandum Decision will serve only as a 
supplement thereto. No further Order need be submitted nor 
entered." (See R. at pp. 327-330, the last paragraph and Addendum 
F) . The defendant, Chadaz, has thus been left to attempt to 
respond to "For the reasons stated in the Plaintiff's motion . . . 
the same is granted." This has resulted in a very arduous 
undertaking. 
As set forth in Rule 52(a), the trial court is required to 
issue a brief written statement of the grounds for its decision on 
all motions granted under Rule 56 when the motion is based on more 
than one ground. According to the Utah Supreme Court, this 
requires more than a blanket reference to the plaintiffs' Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 
949 (Utah 1992) Allen v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins., 839 
P.2d 798 (Utah 1992). (See R. at pp. 322). 
In the Retherford case the Utah Supreme Court, in an opinion 
authored by Justice Zimmerman, held: 
"Such a blanket statement provides us with no 
guidance as to the trial court's reasoning. It therefore 
does not comply with rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure which requires trial judges to issue 
brief written statements of their grounds for granting 
summary judgment when multiple grounds are presented. 
See Utah R.Civ.P.52(a). Although failure to issue a 
statement of grounds is not reversible error absent 
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unusual circumstances, we take this opportunity to remind 
trial judges that the presumption of correctness 
ordinarily afforded trial court rulings "has little 
operative effect when members of this court cannot divine 
the trial courts reasoning because of the cryptic nature 
of its ruling." 
(Retherford at 958(fn.4) (citations omitted). 
It is defendant's position that in the words of the court 
". . . the presumption of correctness ordinarily afforded trial 
court rulings "has little operative effect when members of this 
court cannot divine the trial court's reasoning because the cryptic 
nature of its ruling". 
Defendant's understanding of the law is that failure to object 
or to file a Motion For Amendment To Memorandum Decision under Rule 
52(b) would have precluded the Court of Appeals from considering 
the error on appeal. Alford v. Utah League of Cities and Towns, 
791 P.2d 201 (Utah App. 1990). 
CONCLUSION 
This court should remand this case to the District Court for 
a trial on its merits. The defendant, Chadaz, is entitled to 
present her case to a jury based upon all the evidence that may be 
properly admitted. It is improper for her case to be decided 
summarily. The defendant should be awarded her costs and expenses 
of this appeal. 
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DATED this 1*1- day of June, 1998. 
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE 
Stephen R. Hadfield 
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This agreement made and entered into by and between 
FLOYD CHADAZ and RETA CHADAZ, his wife, of Tremonton, Utah, 
hereinafter referred to as the seller, and HERITAGE PARK PARTNERS, 
a Utah Partnership consisting of MAX D. FRAUGHTON, and 
JAMES C. KAISERMAN of Kaysville, Utah, hereinafter referred 
to as the buyer. 
WITNESSETH: 
THAT WHEREAS the seller is the owner of certain real 
property situate in Box Elder County, Utah, and more parti-
cularly described as set forth in Schedule 1 attached hereto 
and made a part hereof by reference, and the buyer desires to 
purchase the same for the sum of $681,250.00 upon certain terms 
and conditions as hereinafter set out, 
NOW, THEREFORE for and in consideration of the mutual 
promises, covenants and agreements to be performed and kept 
by each with the other as hereinafter set out, the seller 
hereby sells and the buyer hereby purchases the above described 
property on the following terms and conditions to-wit: 
1. The purchase price will be $681,250.00 which shall 
be paid as follows: The sum of $60,000.00 on or before 
March 31, 1980, receipt of which sum is hereby acknowledged 
by the seller, and the balance of $621,250.00 shall be paid 
as follows: The sum of $40,000.00 on or before September 1, 
1980, together with interest on the said $40,000.00 at the 
rate of 15% per annum, with said interest to commence April 
1, 1980 and to continue until the $40,000.00 has been paid. 
The sum of $100,000.00 on, but not before January 5, 1981. 
The balance of $481,250.00, plus interst at the rate of 
10% per anum, which interest shall commence January 5, 1981, 
shall be amortized over a tenyaar period with an annual 
payment of $78,321.00 to be paid on the 5th day of January, 1982, 
with a like amount becoming due and payable on the 5th day of 
January each succeeding year until January 5, 1991, at which time 
the entire balance owing hereunder shall be due and payable. 
The annual payment of $78,321.00 includes both interest and 
principal. It being specifically agreed that commencing with 
the calendar year 1982 the buyer shall have the option to 
pay up to but not more than $100,000.00 principal, plus 
accrued interest, in any one calendar year. It being 
specifically provided, however, that an annual payment of 
$78,321.00 must be made each year regardless of whether or not 
any prepayments have been made. It is further agreed that 
the parties hereto may mutually agree to negotiate higher 
annual payments, provided that such would be agreeable to 
both parties and that a supplemental agreement in writing 
to that effect be signed by each of the parties hereto. 
2. The possession of said premises shall be delivered 
by the seller to the buyer on the 31st day of March, 1980. 
3. The buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments 
levied against said property after April 1, 1980 as the same 
become due and payable, and the seller agrees to pay all 
taxes and assessments levied prior to April 1, 1980. 
4. The sale price of $681,250.00 as set forth herein 
is based on the fact that seller herein shall obtain a survey 
of said property which will show, and be verified, that the 
seller can provide marketable title to buyer of a minimum of 
45.75 acres of land, which survey shall be paid for and 
provided by seller. In the event such survey shows less than 
45.75 acres to which seller can provide marketable title, then 
the said purchase price shall be adjusted downward at the rate 
of $15,000.00 per acre, or any portion of an acre, to which 
seller cannot provide marketable title. In the event such 
survey shall show that seller can provide marketable title 
to more than 45.75 acres, then the said purchase price of 
$681,250.00 as set forth herein shall remain, and buyer 
shall then be entitled to all acreage, upon final payment 
hereunder, to which seller is now in possession. In the 
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event any fence line or any boundary of said property shall 
be within seller's possession, but not within seller's 
record title, seller shall have a period of one year from 
the date of this contract to attempt to clear the title 
to said portion of said property, and upon clearing title 
thereto within such period shall be entitled to payment 
therefor provided such portion shall be necessary to comply 
with the 45.75 acre minimum provision herein contained. In 
the event such title cannot be cleared within the one year 
period specified, seller agrees to quit-claim any such 
possessory rights as they may have to buyer without further 
consideration. 
A. In the event such acreage shall be less than 
the 45.75 acres set forth in the above paragraph, the payments 
due September 1, 1980 and January 5, 1981 shall be and remain 
as set forth, and all subsequent payments commencing January 5, 
1982 shall be reduced accordingly so that the remaining balance, 
plus interest, shall be amortized over the 10 payments commencing 
January 5, 1982, and continuing until January 5, 1991, when all 
amounts owing hereunder shall be due and payable. 
5. The seller agrees to pay a commission of 10% of the 
amount of the purchase price as finally established to Southwick 
Realty, Inc., and to Bill Brown Realty Inc., which commission 
shall be payable 30% at the time of closing on March 31, 1980, 
20% when the September 1, 1980 payment is made, and the balance 
of 50% at the time of payment of the payment due January 5, 1981. 
harmless 
The seller agrees to save and hold buyer/from any claim for 
such commissions. 
6. The payment due March 31, 1980 in the sum of 
$60,000.00, the payment due September 1, 1980 in the sum of 
$40,000.00, and the payment due January 5, 1981 in the sum 
of $100,00.00 are each to be applied to the payment of 
principal. The annual payments commencing January 5, 1982 
and becoming due and payable on the 5th day of January of 
be 
each year thereafter, are to/applied first to the payment 
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of interest and second to the reduction of the principal. 
Interest shall be charged from January 5, 1981 on all 
unpaid portions of the purchase price at the rate of 10% 
per annum. The buyer shall not have the right to make 
payments in excess of those herein set out except as 
specifically set forth in paragraph 1. 
7. It is understood and agreed that if the seller 
accepts payment from the buyer on this contract less than 
according to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, 
it will in no way alter the terms of the contract as to 
the forfeiture hereinafter stipulated or as to any other 
remedies of the seller. 
8. It is understood that there are no outstanding 
obligations against said property at the present time. 
9. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special 
improvement district taxes covering improvements to said 
premises now in the process of being installed, or which 
have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against 
the property, except for assessments made by the Tremonton-
Garland Drainage District which assessments the buyer herein 
agrees to pay. 
10. The seller is given the option to secure, execute 
and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed 
the then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest 
at the rate of not to exceed 10% per annum and payable in 
regular monthly installments; provided that the aggregate 
annual installment payments required to be made by seller 
on said loans shall not be greater than each installment 
payment required to be made by the buyer under this contract. 
When the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amou 
of any such loans and mortgages the seller agrees to convey 
and the buyer agrees to accept title to the above described 
property subject to said loans and mortgages. 
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11. The buyer agrees upon written request of the seller 
to make application to a reliable lender for a loan of such 
amount as can be secured under the regulations of said lender 
and hereby agrees to apply any amount so received upon the 
purchase price above mentioned, and to execute the papers 
required and pay one-half the expenses necessary in obtaining 
said loan, the seller agreeing to pay the other one-half, 
provided however, that the annual payments and interest rate 
required shall not exceed the annual payments and interest 
rate as outlined above. 
12. The buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments 
of every kind and nature which are or which may be assessed 
and which may become due on these premises during the life 
of this agreement. The seller hereby covenants and agrees 
that there are no assessments against said premises at the 
present time. The seller agrees to pay and clear all Green-Belt 
Amendment Roll Back Taxes as parcels are conveyed to the buyer 
hereunder, or its assigns. The seller further convenants and 
agrees that he will not default in the payment of his obligations 
against said property. The seller and buyer both recognize 
the existence of the fact that said property is now being 
assessed under the Green-Belt Amendment, and is subject to 
any claim of Box Elder County for deferred taxes as a result 
of such assessment. The parties hereto agree to cooperate, 
each with the other, to attempt to retain so much of said 
property under said assessment as may be possible, and as 
may qualify, from year to year. However, in the event of 
any change of use of any portion of said property, either by 
buyer, or by their successors or assigns, which would necessitate 
the withdrawal of that portion from the Green-Belt Assessment, 
and the payment of all deferred taxes thereon, seller agrees 
to pay any and all amounts, upon receipt of request from buyer, 
which may be necessary to clear such portion from the effect 
of said assessment up to the date of this contract, and buyer 
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shall assume all responsibility for payment of any such deferred 
taxes which may result from the continuation of such Assessment 
from and after the date of this contract. 
13. It is fully understood and agreed that all water 
rights appurtenant to said tracts of real property conveyed 
herein shall be and remain the property of the seller. That 
no water rights are being conveyed hereunder. The seller 
specifically agrees to pay all water assessments levied or 
attached against said water rights or the real property herein 
to be conveyed. 
14. The buyer agrees to pay the general taxes after 
March 31, 1980. 
15. In the event the buyer shall default in the payment 
of any special or general taxes or assessments as herein provided, 
the seller may, at his option, pay said taxes and assessments, 
or either of them, and if seller elects so to do, then the 
buyer agrees to repay the seller upon demand all such sums 
so advanced and paid by him, together with interest thereon 
from date of payment of said sums at the rate of 1% per month 
until paid. 
16. Buyer agrees that he will not commit or suffer to 
be committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon said 
premises, and that he will maintain said premises in good 
condition. 
17. Seller agrees to release parcels of property to 
the buyer upon the following basis: 
A. Any reference hereinafter contained to the 
"north portion of said property" shall be construed to be 
that portion of said property lying north of the centerline 
of Second South Street extended easterly to the east line 
of said property, and any reference hereinafter contained 
to the "south portion of said property" shall be construed 
to be that portion of said property lying south of the center 
line of Second South Street extended easterly to the east 
line of said property. 
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B. Seller agrees, upon receipt of the down payment 
to be made by buyer on or before March 31, 1980, to convey 
to buyer, his successors or assigns, a tract of land which 
shall encompass either three (3) acres in the north portion 
of said property, or 4.5 acres in the south portion of said 
property, or any proportionate amount in either the north 
portion or the south portion of said property based upon 
$20,000 per acre for the north portion and $13,333.33 for 
the south portion, which election shall be made solely at the 
discretion of the buyer, his successors or assigns. 
C. Seller agrees, upon receipt of the payment 
due September 1, 1980, to convey to buyer, his successors 
or assigns, 2.0 acres in the north portion of said property 
or 3.0 acres in the south portion of said property, or any 
proportionate amount in either the north portion or the south 
portion of said property based upon $20,000 per acre for the north 
portion and $13,333.33 for the south portion, which election shall 
be made solely at the discretion of the buyer, his successors 
or assigns. 
D. Upon payment by buyer to seller of the $100,000.00 
due January 5, 1981, seller further agrees to convey to buyer, 
or his successors or assigns, an additional five (5) acres 
in the north portion of said property, or an additional 7.5 acres 
in the south portion of said property, or any proportionate amount 
in either the north portion or the south portion of said property 
based upon $20,000 per acre for the north portion and $13,333.33 
for the south portion; location of which shall be solely at the 
discretion of the buyer, his successors or assigns. 
E. Additional acreage will be conveyed by seller 
to buyer upon request of the buyer on the basis of $25,000.00 
per acre for the north portion of said property, and on the 
basis of $15,000.00 per acre for the south portion of said 
property. Such acreage figures shall be calculated only 
as the principal balance is reduced by such amounts, and any 
application of any amount of any payment to the payment of 
interest shall not be construed as entitling buyer, his 
successors or assigns to a conveyance of any land for such 
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interest payment. It is fully understood and agreed as 
recited in paragraph 6 of this contract that buyer, his 
successors or assigns, may not prepay any amounts except 
as specifically set forth in the said paragraph 1. It being 
specifically understood that should the buyer make accelerated 
payments as provided for in paragraph 1, buyer would be 
entitled to conveyances for any such amounts prepaid as 
they would be applied to the reduction of principal on the 
basis of the price per acre set forth herein. Any prepayment 
shall be applied to the end of the contract, and the buyer 
shall be required to make annual payments as herein set forth 
each year until the entire contract has been paid in full. 
F. Conveyances to buyer by seller of any acreage 
under the foregoing provisions shall be made with the provisos 
that seller shall be relieved of such responsibility to do so in 
the event of (1) any payment due hereunder being delinquent, and 
not being brought current to the date of such conveyance, or (2) 
seller shall have the right to retain such portions of said land 
as may be reasonably necessary for ingress and egress to and from 
the remaining land of seller, or (3) that seller shall have the 
right to determine that such remaining land which is not conveyed 
shall be and act as sufficient security for the balance of any 
amounts remaining owing under the terms of this contract. 
G. In order to carry out the terms and conditions of 
this agreement, the parties hereto mutually agree that title to 
the property covered by this agreement shall be placed in trust 
with Hillam Abstracting & Insurance Agency, Inc. which trust shall 
be subject to the terms and conditions of this agreement, and the 
Trustee shall be bound by the terms and conditions of this agreement. 
18. Buyer hereby gives the right to seller to farm any 
portion of the land covered by this contract during the term 
of this contract, without consideration therefore, subject to 
the provisos that (a) in the event any tract of land which 
seller is farming is sold by buyer herein, or (b) in the 
event any portion of such land shall be needed, as solely 
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determined by buyer, his successors or assigns, for development 
purposes, buyer, nor his successors, shall assume no obligation 
as to any damage which may be created to crops which may be 
planted by seller, nor shall buyer, his successors or assigns, 
have any liability to seller for any such damage or for any 
crops which may be destroyed in the process of such development, 
or in the preparation of any portion of said land for develop-
ment purposes, or for any purpose which may be related to such 
development. It is the intent and purpose of these provisos 
that seller shall conduct any such farming at his own risk, 
and shall assume any and all risk of loss which may be inherent 
or caused by the development of said land, or any portion thereof. 
19. In the event of failure to comply with the terms 
hereof by the buyer, or upon failure of the buyer to make any 
payment or payments when the same shall become due, or within 
thirty (30) days thereafter, the seller, at his option shall 
have the following alternative remedies: 
A. Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the 
buyer to remedy the default within five (5) days after written 
notice, to be released from all obligations in law and in equity 
to convey said property, and all payments which have been made 
theretofore on this contract by the buyer, shall be forfeited to 
the seller as liquidated damages for the non-performance of the 
contract, and the buyer agrees that the seller may at his option 
re-enter and take possession of said premises without legal process 
as in its first and former estate, together with all improvements 
and additions made by the buyer thereon, and the said additions 
and improvements shall remain with the land and become the property 
of the seller, the buyer becoming at once a tenant at will of 
the seller. It being specifically provided that in the event the 
seller exercises this option A that they will give written notice 
ten days prior to the exercise of said option to anyone showing 
a recorded interest in and to the property covered by this 
agreement; or 
B. The seller may bring suit and recover judgment 
for all delinquent installments, including costs and attorneys 
fees. (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall 
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not prevent the seller, at his option, from resorting to one 
of the other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent 
default); or 
C. Seller shall have the right, at his option, and 
upon written notice to the buyer to declare the entire unpaid 
balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to 
treat this contract as a note and mortgage, and pass title 
to the buyer subject thereto, and proceed immediately to 
foreclose the same in accordance with the laws of the State 
of Utah, and have the property sold and the proceeds applied 
to the payment of the balance owing, including costs and 
attorneys fees; and the seller may have a judgment for any 
deficiency which may remain. In the case of foreclosure, 
the seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall 
be immediately entitled to the appointment of a receiver to 
take possession of said mortgaged property and collect the 
rents, issues and profits therefrom and apply the same to 
the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same 
pursuant to order of the court; and the seller, upon entry 
of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the possession 
of said premises during the period of redemption. 
20. It is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement. 
21. In the event there are any liens or encumbrances 
against said premises other than those herein provided for or 
referred to, or in the event any liens or encumbrances other 
than herein provided shall hereafter accrue against the 
same by acts or neglect of the seller, then the buyer may, 
at his option, pay and discharge the same and receive credit 
on the amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of 
any such payment or payments and thereafter the payments 
herein provided to be made, may, at the option of the buyer, 
be suspended until such time as such suspended payments shall 
equal any sums advanced as aforesaid. 
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22. The seller on receiving the payments herein reserved 
to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned agrees 
to execute and deliver to the buyer or assigns, a good and 
sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to the above 
described premises free and clear of all encumbrances except 
as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued by or 
through the acts or neglect of the buyer, and to furnish at 
his expense, a policy of title insurance in the amount of 
the purchase price. 
23. The buyer and seller each agree that should they 
default in any of the covenants or agreements contained herein 
that the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses 
including a reasonable attorneys fee, which may arise or 
accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession 
of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any remedy 
provided hereunder or by the statutes of the State of Utah 
whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise. 
24. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid 
are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators, 
successors, and assigns of the respective parties hereto. 
STATE OF UTAH 
:ss 
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER ) 
On the IZ- day of May, 1980, personally appeared before 
me Floyd Chadaz and Reta Chadaz, his wife, signers of the 
within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they 
executed the same. 
My Commission Expires 
January 8, 1982 
Public 
Residing at gham City, Utah 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF J^j i*2lJur )' 
On the )Z~ day of May, 1980, personally appeared before me 
Max D. Fraughton, and James C.Kaiserman, individually and as 
partners of Heritage Park Partners, a Utah Partnership, who 
duly acknowledged to me that they executed the within instrument. 
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~nd 50 fee t North therefrom; thence M 0 o 0 4 f l ' ' " £ 2563.4 f ee t ; 
thence N 86°37f 35"r 236. J r ee l ; tlier.ee ^ ju th 191.3 f e e t ; thence 
:» eP°37'35M E 410.0 f e e t ; thence *Jorth 191.0 fee t to the point 
be^innirir, c o n t o ^ i n r 47.22 =cres. 
The s e l l e r r e s e r v e s t h e r i g h t t o r emove t h e two s t e e l 




This agreement made and entered into by and between 
FLOYD CHADAZ and RETA CHADAZ, his wife, of Tremonton, Utah, 
hereinafter referred to as the seller, and HERITAGE PARK 
PARTNERS, a Utah Partnership consisting of MAX D. FRAUGHTON 
and JAMES C. KAISERMAN, partners and individually, and TRIPLE 
"S" DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah Corporation, RONALD W. STOUT, 
GERALD E. STOUT and GARY V. SMITH, hereinafter referred to as buyer. 
WITNESSETH: 
THAT WHEREAS the seller entered into an agreement to sell 
certain real property to Heritage Park Partners, a Utah partnership 
consisting of Max D. Fraughton, James C. Kaiserman and James E. 
Oldham, which agreement is dated the (&* day of May, 1980, and 
WHEREAS Max D. Fraughton entered into an agreement whereby 
he sold to Triple "S" Development Inc., a Utah corporation, his 
entire interest in Heritage Park Partnership, which agreement 
was dated June 30,1980, and 
WHEREAS Ronald W. Stout, Gerald ff. Stout, and Gary V. Smith 
entered into a personal guarantee of the agreement between 
Fraughton and Triple "S" Development Inc., which guarantee 
is dated June 30, 1980, and 
WHEREAS Heritage Park Partners, a Utah partnership consisting 
of Max D. Fraughton, James C. Kaiserman and James E. Oldham have 
been unable to meet their requirements for payment pursuant to 
their agreement dated the |X day of May, 1980, in that the 
$40,000.00 which was to have been paid on or before September 1, 
1980, together with interest on said amount at the rate of 15% 
per annum, has not been paid, and 
WHEREAS it appears necessary that if the property sold 
by Chadaz's is to be developed as intended by Heritage Park, 
Partners, that additional time is necessary in order for the 
buyers to obtain the necessary financing, 
NOW, THEREFORE for and in consideration of the mutual 
promises, covenants and agreements to be performed and kept 
by each with the other as hereinafter set out, it is hereby 
agreed between the parties to this supplemental agreement 
as follows: 
1. The seller hereby extends to the buyer the time 
within which to make the $40,000.00 payment which was to have 
been made on September 1, 1980, so that said payment shall now 
become due and payable Ilarch 1, 1981, on which date the 
$40,000.00 together with interest on said $40,000.00 (at the 
rate of 15% per annum; said interest to commence April 1, 1980 
and continue until the $40,000.00 has been paid) shall be due 
and payable. 
2. The time within which to pay the $100,000.00 payment 
which was to have been paid on January 5, 1981 is hereby 
extended to August 1, 1981. It being specifically understood 
and agreed that interest at the rate of 12% per annum shall 
be paid on said $100,000.00 with said interest to commence 
January 5, 1981, and to continue until the $100,000.00 has 
been paid in full. 
3. The buyer specifically agrees to take any and all 
action that may be necessary or desirable in order to complete 
the development and to obtain the financing necessary to comply 
with the terms and conditions of their purchase agreement with 
the seller. The buyer specifically agrees to take the following 
action: 
(a) File with the Farmers Home Administration 
application for a loan guarantee on 2.2 million dollars, 
which application has been filed prior to the execution of 
this supplemental agreement. 
(b) To file for a loan of interim financing and 
the sale of industrial revenue bonds with Commercial Security 
Bank, and buyer represents to the seller that this action has 
already been taken. 
-2-
(c) To make best effort to have preliminary plans and 
a preliminary plat approved by the Planning Commission and City 
Council of Tremonton prior to February 1, 1981. 
(d) To have completed and make available for 
inspection preliminary drawings and costs estimates on the 
development project prior to February 1, 1981. 
(e) To do everything possible to obtain tenative 
approval from the Farmers Home Administration, and from 
Commercial Security Bank prior to February 1, 1981. 
(f) Do everything possible to obtain final 
approval from Farmers Home Administration and Commercial 
Security Bank prior to April 1, 19 81. This is to include 
final drawings and a construction contract. 
(g) Take whatever action may be necessary in 
order to begin construction prior to May 1, 1981. 
4. The buyer agrees that when the property fronting 
on main street, which has been released by the seller to the 
buyer, has been sold by the buyer to a third party that there 
will be a reservation of a 66 foot wide roadway from Main Street 
to the seller's remaining property. It being specifically 
provided that this roadway will be complete with curb, gutter, 
sidewalks, sewer, and pavement, and shall be completed prior 
to October 1, 1981. The buyer shall also obtain or reserve an 
easement or other reservation so that the seller (Floyd and Reta 
Chadaz) can pipe their irrigation water in the existing ditch 
along the west property line of the property that has been released 
to the property that has not been released. But that buyer or 
third party shall have to pay no part of the costs. 
5. The buyer agrees to develop and sell the• oown lots on 
the south side of the property which have already been released 
to the buyer. It being specifically provided that the buyer 
shall construct a 60-foot wide improved paved road with all utilities 
furnished and stubbed to property at the approximate location as shown 
-3-
on the attached conceptual plat. It being specifially provided that 
all expenses in connection with this road will be paid by the 
buyer, and that said road will provide access to the remainder 
of the seller's property. This road shall be completed prior to 
October 1, 1981. 
6. It is specifically understood and agreed that this 
agreement is supplemental to that certain agreement made and 
entered into on the IX day of May, 1980 between Floyd Chadaz 
and Reta Chadaz, seller, and Heritage Park Partners, a Utah 
partnership consisting of Max D. Fraughton, James C. Kaiserman, 
and James E. Oldham, partners and individually, and that said 
original agreement shall remain in full force and effect except 
as herein specifically modified. 
7. Max D. Fraughton, James C. Kaiserman, James E. Oldham, 
Ronald W. Stout, Gerald E. Stout and Gary V. Smith each agree that 
they are personally and individually responsible and liable for the 
true and faithful performance of this supplemental agreement 
and also all of the terms and conditions of that certain 
agreement made and entered into on the __J_7/^ ay of May, 1980 
between Floyd Chadaz and Reta Chadaz and Heritage Park Partners. 
8. Heritage Park will pay legal fees to prepare this 
agreement. 
9. Heritage Park Partners will provide a copy of road 
improvement agreement. 
10. This supplemental agreement shall be binding upon 
the heirs, personal representatives and assigns of each of the 
parties hereto and should any party default in any of the 
terms, covenants and conditions of this supplemental agreement 
the defaulting party agrees to pay all costs and expenses of 
enforcing this agreement including reasonable attorneys fees. 
DATED this 2$ ^ day of November, 1980. 
SELLER 
BUYER 
HERITAGE PARK PARTNERS 
By_ 
Max D. Fraughton, partner 
ames E. Oldham, partner 
Max D. Fraughton, individually 
James C. RalSermah, individually 
*&SJuk~^ 
ames E. Oldham, individually 
TRIPLE "S" DEVELOPMENT INC. 
A Utah Corporation 
By_ Ci/ /XJ.'SM 
Ronald W. Stout, President 
out, Individually 
STATE OF UTAH 
:ss 
{ Gary V^ Smith, individually 
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER ) 
On the Z?6' day of /?7/«?,'Ww , 1980, personally appeared 
before me Floyd Chadaz and Reta Chadaz, his wife, signers of 
the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they 
executed the same. 
My Commission Expires 
January 8, 1982 
Residing at Briiham City, Utah 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
v :ss 
COUNTY OF (>&*"> ) 
On the *^5~y day of ^^cr^*^^] , 19 80, personally 
appeared before me Max D. Fraughton, James C.Kaiserman, and 
James E.Oldham, partners of Heritage Park Partners, signers of 
the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they 
executed the same. 
Notary Public s 
Residing at: /y- ^^^ s^z^S 
My Commission Expires 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF £>«*><* ) 
On the zyZz day of y^-crt^-^^ , 1980, personally appeared 
before me Max D. Fraughton, James C. Kaiserman, and James E. Oldham, 
individually, signers of the within instrument, who duly acknow-
ledged to me that they executed the same. 
S>^ ^ ^ Notary Public 
Residing at: ^ ^ _ J ? ^ ^ ^ 
My Commission Expires 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: s s 
COUNTY OF £Xu^i ) 
On the 2S"£ day of ^ Ox^^c*-^\ , 1980, personally 
appeared before me Ronald W. Stout and <£ «^
 /y £ ^, /i^ 
who being by me duly sworn did say, each for Tiimself, that he, 
the said Ronald W. Stout is the president, and he, the said 
G* ^  is >^/ 4C\ is the secretary of Triple "S" Development 
Inc., ci Utah Corporation, and that the within and foregoing 
instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority 
of a resolution of its board of directors and said Ronald W. Stout 
and Co. ^  tX * S^ / /A each duly acknowledged to me that said 
corporation executed the same and that the seal affixed is the 
seal of said corporation. 
Notary Public ^ ^ 
Residing at: /<1^_^ ^ ^ 
My Commission Expires 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF ) 
On the J2 j~tf day of H Y H ~ W ^ / 1980, personally 
appeared before me Ronald W. Stout, Gerald E. Stout, and 
Gary V. Smith, individually, signers of the within instrument 
who duly acknowledged to me that they executed the same. 
Residing at: / T ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 









Recorded at Request oL AMRGARFT P. FVAM* 
«t3:Q5P M. Fee Paid } ?«°° 
m fl Heritage. I^ri^Partn^ra 
Box Elder County Recorder 
•gcighqm Ciiy, Ululi 043:32 DEC 9 1980 
Mail tax notice to. 
i. Book 222_ Page 6 78 
l l^^Devon^-^ ldysTi l l e , Ut; 
.Address. 
WARRANTY DEED *m 339r«678 
! -1 
HERITAGE PARK PARTNERS, 
of K a y s v i l l e 
CONVEY, and WARRANT to 
, County of D a v i s 
grantors ; \ 
, State of Utah, hereby ! | 
HERITAGE PARK PLAZA, I N C . , a Utah Corporat ion* 
H 
of K a y s v i l l e , County o f D a v i s , S t a t e o f Utah 
TEN AND N O / 1 0 0 — - — - r - - ™ ~ T 
and o t h e r good a n d v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
the following described tract of land in Box E l d e r 
State of Utah: 
- SEE SCHEDULE "A" ATTACHED HERETO -
grantee 






"•'" DEC 9 1980 
""« 3:05PM *••* 5 .00 
i^ T,"', 313—..r^ JZlfi ~ 
M«rg«r«t R. Ev«nt, fUcord«r *y 
loa £U«r County. UUh
 a »? /&*>-
!:1 
! i 
2 4 t h WITNESS, the hands of said grantocs , this 
O c t o b e r ,A. D. 19 80 
HERITAGE PARK PARTNERS, by 
day of 
Signed in the Presence of ^ f e w ^ ; r<4>&&&>?**~~' 
JAMES C. KAIS^R^AN, Partner 
t r i e r 
GERA E. S T O U T , p a r t n e r 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of S a l t Lake ss. TJA6Y \g/SMITH, P a r t n e r 
i \ 
! i 
On the 24 t h day of O c t o b e r , A. D.. 1980 
personally appeared before me James C. K a i s e r m a n , J a m e s Oldham, RQr\al4jW*. 
S t o u t , G e r a l d W. S t o u t , and Gary V. S m i t h , P a r t n e r s o f • HQfftage:'.P'ark 
the signers of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that 'tfcey^f^ecutedthe' 
same* for and in bahalf of said partnership. ..„./ • O^, \'*, 
My commission expire, 1 - 1 8 - 8 1
 P A . M i w g ,„ S a l t Lake C i t y . -Utah-
P a r t n e r -




— -^-: »l_ANIC.#tO!-^-WAH«ANTT .DtCOr-u-C CCM K 1 C X O . f-r S1IS S0..2«O0 (AST .—. SALT L A * * CITY.. 
PART OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER OF SECTION 10, TllN, R3W, SLB 
BOOK 339?iGE 6 7 9 
BEGINNING AT A POINT ON THE SOUTH LINE OF THE HIGHWAY RIGHT-
OF-WAY WHICH IS LOCATED S89°51'47"W 637.42 FEET ALONG THE 
SECTION LINE AND S0°35'46"W 50.00 FEET FROM THE NORTHEAST 
CORNER OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER OF SECTION 10, TUN, R3W, 
SLB & M; POINT OF BEGINNING ALSO BEING LOCATED N89°51'47"E 
3.00 FEET FROM THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF PLAT R, TREMONTON 
CIJY SURVEY, THENCE S0°35'46"W 300.05 FEET, THENCE N89° 
47'46"E 231.06 FEET, THENCE NORTH 299.75 FEET TO THE SOUTH 
HIGHWAY RIGHT-OF-WAY LINE (POINT ALSO BEING THE NORTHWEST 
CORNER OF THE HARRIS TRUCK AND EQUIPMENT, INC. PROPERTY), 
THENCE S89°51'47"W 227.94 FEET ALONG SAID SOUTH HIGHWAY 
RIGnT-OF-WAY LINE TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 






Tax Notices t o : 
yillatek Inc. C/0 Golden Spike Bk. 
rreaonton, UUh 84337 
SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED 
(CORPOKAT* PORK]
 t m 3 3 9 p i G E g g Q 
HERITAGE PARK PLAZA, INC., a Utah Corporation « a corporation 
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal office at 
K a y s v i l l e , of County of Davis , State of Utah, 
grantor, hereby CONVEYS AND WARRANTS against all claiming by, through or under it to 
VILLATEK INC., a Utah Corporation 
grantee 
of S a l t Lake C i t y , County of S a l t Lake, S t a t e of Utah for the sum of 
T 4^^^^^«lf iS^---a-v |J=i l I i ;c6 ; l ra ^ H E ro S - - -~^ : 
State of Utah: 
- SEE SCHEDULE "A" ATTACHED HERETO -
«*• 82458H 
• •• > a 
p




^iOPM *"* 5.50 ,. 
M4r9«r«t R. £*«««, R«<©«** 
|o< £U«f County. UUK 
The officers who sign this deed hereby certify that this deed and the transfer represented 
thereby was duly authorised under a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the 
grantor at ,a lawful meeting duly held and attended by a quorum. 
In witness whereof, the grantor has caused its corporate name and seal to be hereunto affixed 
by its duly authorized officers this 24 th day of October , AJX 1980 
Jt&R£££&E_^^ 
By JAMES C. KAISERMANy 
[CORPORATE SEAL] J \ President. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of S a l t Lake V 
On the 24 th day of October ,A . D. 1980 
personally appeared before meJames C. Xaiserman xsnd 
who being by me duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he, the said James C. Kaiserman 
is the president, sxkhefthoeaid xtethottttfscaiyc 
of HERITAGE PARK PLAZA. INC. , and that the within and foregoing 
instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution of its board of 
directors and said JAMES C. KAISERMAN ntftdx / . ^ 
each duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same and that the seal-affixed 
is the seal of said corporation. „—,
 s '* • ' - . . . 
\ [ (\) ^X 7 '. Notary Public. 
I t
 w . . . 1-18-81 w . . V * S a l t La5$e C i t y . . Utah My commission expires .7.. ... My residence is.. 
PART OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER OF SECTION 10, TllN, R3W, SLB 
BOOK 3 3 9 ™ 6 8 1 
BEGINNING AT A POINT ON THE SOUTH LINE OF THE HICHWAY R I G H T -
OF-WAY WHICH IS LOCATED S 8 9 ° 5 1 ' 4 7 " W 6 3 7 . 4 2 FEET ALONG THE 
SECTION LINE AND S 0 ° 3 5 ' 4 6 H W 5 0 . 0 0 FEET FROM THE NORTHEAST 
CORNER OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER OF SECTION 1 0 , T l l N , R3W, 
SLB 6 M; POINT OF BEGINNING ALSO BEING LOCATED N 0 9 ° 5 1 ' 4 7 U E 
3 . 0 0 FEET FROM THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF PLAT R, TREMONTON 
CITY SURVEY, THENCE S 0 ° 3 5 ' 4 6 M W 3 0 0 . 0 5 FEET, THENCE N 8 9 ° 
4 7 ' 4 6 M E 2 3 1 . 0 6 FEET, THENCE NORTH 2 9 9 . 7 5 FEET TO THE SOUTH 
HIGHWAY RIGHT-OF-WAY LINE (POINT ALSO BEING THE NORTHWEST 
CORNER OF THE HARRIS TRUCK AND EQUIPMENT, I N C . PROPERTY), 
THENCE S 8 9 ° 5 1 ' 4 7 " W 2 2 7 . 9 4 FEET ALONG SAID SOUTH HIGHWAY 
RIGHT-OF-WAY LINE TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
CONTAINS 1 . 5 8 ACRES 
SUBJECT TO A RIGHT-OF-WAY OVER THE E*ST 66 FEET OF .SAID PROPERTY, FOR 
THE PURPOSE OF A PROPOSED ROAD. 
THE GRANTORS HEREIN RESERVE A RIGHT OF K\Y FOR TOE PURPOSE OF INSTALL-
ING AND MAINTAINING A BILLBOARD, OVER A PORTION OF SAID PROPERTY, MORE 
PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT 66 FEET WEST OF THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF THE AFORE-
DESCRIBED PARCEL, AND RUNNING THENCE WEST S FEET; THENCE SOUTH 15 FEET; 
THENCE EAST S FEET; THENCE NORTH I S FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
TOGETHER WITH AN EASEMENT, AS NECESSARY FOR THE PURPOSE OF RUNNING A 
TOWER LINE TO SAID BILLBOARD. 
ABSTO. IN m f X f ••-
SQEDULE "A" 




IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEAN R. POTTER and DIANE S. 
POTTER dba DEAtt1 S SUPER LUBE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RETA CHADAZ (Party who claims 
66 foot Right-of-Way); 
GARY BYWATER and KARLEEN C. 
BYWATER (On Warranty Deed); 
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INS. CO., 
(On Title Policy); 
and JOHN DOES 1-10, who may 
claim interest in said Right-of 
Way. 
Defendants. 
THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT upon Cross Motions for Summary 
Judgment, the first having been filed by Plaintiffs Potter and the 
second by Defendant Chadaz. Thought the Motions demonstrate that 
there are some remaining issues of fact, the Court finds those 
issues are not sufficient to barr the granting of the Motion for 
Summary Judgment, on June 17, 1997, this matter was argued and the 
issues were identified. Thereafter, the Court received 
supplemental argument by both parties. 
Without reciting all the issues and the basis for decision, 
the Court acknowledges that perhaps holding the Wade case (In the 
* 
* 
* MEMORANDUM DECISION 
* Case No. 960000272QT 
* 








Matter of the Estate of: Thompson v. Wade. 509 N.E. 2nd 309 (New 
York 1987) is not entirely justified, but neither is the 
Defendant's reliance helpful. "Stranger to the deed" principles are 
not particularly beneficial to either party. 
For the other reasons stated in the Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, the same is granted. The Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed by Defendant is denied. Counsel for the Plaintiff 
is directed to prepare a formal Order in conformance herewith. 
DATED this 11 day of September, 1997. 
2°\(o 




I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION, Dean R. And Diane B. Potter v. Reta 
Chadaz et al, Case No. 960000272, postage prepaid, this /* day 
of September, 1997, to the following: 
MARLIN J. GRANT, ESQ. 
88 West Center 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84323-0525 
JEFF R. THORNE, ESQ. 
98 North Main 
P.O. Box 876 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
REED W. HADFIELD, ESQ. 
98 North Main 
P.O. Box 876 
Brigham City, UT 843 02 
& Sxil 




IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT/ COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEAN R. POTTER and DIANE S. 
POTTER dba DEAN'S SUPER LUBE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
RETA CHADAZ (Party who claims 
66 foot Right-of-Way); 
GARY BYWATER and KARLEEN C. 
BYWATER (On Warranty Deed); 
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INS. CO., 
(On Title Policy); 
and JOHN DOES 1-10, who may 
















Case No. 96O0OO272QT 
Judge Gordon J. Low 
THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT upon a Motion brought by 
Defendant Chadaz for the Court to amend its Memorandum Decision and 
more specifically designate which grounds on the Rule 56 Motion 
which constituted the basis for the Decision. 
In its formal Order as prepared by Plaintiff's counsel, the 
Court stated that the Summary Judgment was based upon the 
arguments, facts, and laws represented in Plaintiff's Memorandum 
and supplemental responses. By way of specificity, Defendant 
Chadaz conveyed away all rights of the 1.5 acres. No reservation 




Defendant's benefit. Defendant Chadaz does not have privity of 
contract and subsequent negotiations do not create a valid interest 
in favor of Chadaz. Chadaz did not receive any rights in the deed 
from Heritage Park Plaza Inc. to Villatek and Heritage Park Plaza 
Inc. could not reserve to Chadaz something it did not own. It was 
Chadaz's failure to reserve the right-of-way in the conveyance of 
the property to Heritage Park partners that would extinguish any 
right to then, or later, claim any easement. 
Plaintiffs' purchase of the property occurred prior to the alleged 
Quit Claim Deed from Heritage Park Plaza Inc. to Defendant Chadaz. 
The easement, if one ever existed, and if it consisted of any 
rights in Defendant Chadaz, was obviously, by all facts presented, 
unused for a period of approximately sixteen (16) years. No notice 
by any reliable factors before the Court demonstrate that 
Plaintiffs had notice of a transfer between Heritage Park Plaza 
Inc. and Reta Chadaz when Plaintiffs purchased the property. Any 
right that Heritage Park Plaza and/or Villatek may have had by way 
of easement, certainly could not be claimed to be in existence as 
demonstrated at the very least by the fact that Heritage Park Plaza 
was a defunct corporation as early as 1983. 
Plaintiffs have claimed estoppel and there are, as reflected 
in their Memorandum and Affidavits, considerable reasons for the 
Court to give deference to that legal theory. Though there is some 
dispute relative to the claimed right-of-way, nothing appears of 
record and no evidence is presented that the right-of-way was used 
by Defendant Chadaz or others. Indeed, Defendant Chadaz has at 
least one, if not several, access routes to her property which were 
used in lieu of any claimed right-of-way across Plaintiffs1 
property. No easement by necessity can be claimed here. 
Plaintiffs installed substantial improvements on the property, none 
of which were ever objected to by Defendant Chadaz. The facts also 
demonstrate that it is apparent that the claimed right-of-way has 
not, nor could be, reasonably used by Defendant Chadaz as the 
condition and terrain of the land, the ditch and the drop-off would 
demonstrate. 
Plaintiffs have in fact been shown as bonafide purchasers 
without notice of the easement. Whether it existed ever or was 
extinguished by non-use, the easement had to have been terminated 
by the division of the property by Villatek, one of which went to 
Bywaters and eventually to the Plaintiff. No reservation of any 
deed was ever claimed by any of the parties and no number ever 
conveyed or reserved. The language relative to land deed or 
easement was for consideration for purchase of property, which 
purchase was never consummated, nor was the anticipated and 
envisioned subdivision ever started as was envisioned with respect 
to the claimed easement. There was a time certain for the 
completion of the claimed roadway which was October 1, 1981. It 
can certainly be concluded that failure to complete the roadway by 
that time vitiated any agreement, claim or right with respect to 
the same. Consideration entirely failed, conditions present 
failed, and it can only be concluded that the intended use was 
therefore frustrated and if any easement existed, the same became 
nullified at that point. The Defendant essentially clams a right 
as a third party beneficiary to a failed contract. That is not an 
enforceable right against a non-party. In such cases, the 
Defendant's relief is not for specific performance against a 
stranger to the agreement, but for damages, if any, as against one 
of the parties. 
As stated in the Court!s original Order in this case and as 
found in the original Memorandum Decision, the Motion for Summary 
Judgment brought by the Plaintiffs is granted and this Memorandum 
Decision will serve only as a supplement thereto. No further Order 
need be submitted nor entered. 
DATED this 




I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION, Dean R. And Diane B. Potter v. Reta 
Chadaz et al, Case No. 960000272, postage prepaid, this day 
of October, 1997, to the following: 
MARLIN J. GRANT, ESQ. 
88 West Center 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84323-0525 
JEFF R. THORNE, ESQ. 
98 North Main 
P.O. Box 876 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
REED W. HADFIELD, ESQ. 
98 North Main 
P.O. Box 876 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
ft.^Vxl £ 
Deputy Court Clerk 
I:\wp\potter.mem 
